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ADAPTING LIKE THE ANIMALS: THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AS A
MODEL FOR HUMAN ADAPTATION TO
CLIMATE CHANGE
INTRODUCTION

T

uvalu, a small, remote island nation made up of nine coral
atolls, lies halfway between Australia and Hawai’i.1 Tuvalu is, in many ways, an earthly paradise, with white sand
beaches that are surrounded by the turquoise waters of the
South Pacific. Those same waters are now threatening the country’s very existence. Because of global climate change, Tuvalu is
slowly succumbing to the sea.2 Tuvalu will be one of the first
populated islands to disappear as sea-levels continue to rise,
leaving its 11,000 inhabitants both homeless and stateless.3
Some estimates suggest that by as early as 2050 Tuvalu could
be completely submerged.4 But Tuvaluans are not giving up
without a fight. The islanders considered bringing litigation
against countries that refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol and in
2002 their government persuaded New Zealand to accept the entire population of Tuvalu as climate change refugees at a rate of
sixty per year.5 Although these are encouraging first steps, such

1. The
World
Factbook,
CENT.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tv.html (last
updated June 20, 2014).
2. Tiffany T.V. Duong, When Islands Drown: The Plight of “Climate
Change Refugees” and Recourse to International Human Rights Law, 31 U. PA.
J. INT’L L. 1239, 1239 (2010).
3. Id.
4. Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change Displacement to Refuge, 25 J.
ENVT’L L. LITIG. 19, 25 (2010).
5. See Tom Price, Global Warming: High Tide in Tuvalu, SIERRA CLUB
MAG. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.tuvaluislands.com/news/archived/2003/200307-A.htm; see also Tuvalu, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 17, 2001),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1133294 [hereinafter
NPR]. In 2001, Tuvalu, Fiji, Kiribati, Tonga, and New Zealand adopted the
Pacific Access Category (PAC), an immigration agreement that allows people
suffering from the effects of climate change on Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Tonga to
relocate and receive residency in New Zealand. PAC uses an annual quota system; up to 400 residents are permitted to migrate to New Zealand annually.
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measures fall far short of the mitigative and adaptive solutions
that climate change demands.6 More expansive initiatives are
needed.
Though the planet has always experienced a level of natural
climate change variability, the current period of rising global
surface temperatures is without precedent in recent years, or
perhaps even the entirety of human history.7 It is also irreversible, at least in the near future.8 Because of this, framing climate
change as an “either-or choice between mitigation and adaptation”9 is at best futile and at worst a diversion of precious time
and resources. That mankind must “[a]dapt or perish, now as
ever, is nature’s inexorable imperative;”10 and in the face of
global climate change, the need to adapt is more urgent than
ever. Tuvalu is one of countless states that will be dramatically
altered by climate change in the coming decades, regardless of
our ultimate mitigation efforts.11 In many cases, people in these
regions will face incredible hardships that simply cannot be prevented.12 Thus, it is necessary to explore all available means of
coping with climate change, particularly adaptive measures that

Pacific Access Category, IMMIGRATION NEW ZEALAND (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://www.immigration.govt.nz/opsmanual/46183.htm.
6. Although seemingly generous when compared to Australia, which refused outright to accept any Tuvaluan environmental refugees, the PAC sets a
number of restrictions on which islanders qualify for residency. These parameters mean that many, specifically those most vulnerable (i.e., children, the
elderly, the uneducated, the unskilled, and the poor) will be refused residency
under the PAC. A Citizen’s Guide to Climate Refugees, SAFECOM INC., (Jan. 17,
2014), http://www.safecom.org.au/foe-climate-guide.htm.
7. FORUM 2009: CLIMATE CHANGE ― THE ANATOMY OF A SILENT CRISIS,
GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN FORUM (2009) 1, 6 available at http://www.ghfge.org/human-impact-report.pdf.
8. A Citizen’s Guide to Climate Refugees, supra note 6.
9. J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVT’L L. 363, 369–71 (2010); see also Philip
E. Hulme, Adapting to Climate Change: Is there Scope for Ecological Management in the Face of a Global Threat? 42 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 784, 785 (2005).
10. H.G. Wells, THE MIND AT THE END OF ITS TETHER 1, 19 (1945).
11. Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Mozambique, Gambia, Senegal, Suriname, China, India, and other island states are particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels. All are likely to be faced with extreme refugee crises as
the effects of global warming become more dire. See Norman Myers, Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World, 43 BIOSCIENCE 752, 753–56
(1993).
12. Id. at 752–53.
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provide long-term solutions to the long-term problem that is
global warming.
So far, the international community has largely failed to make
sufficient progress, in terms of climate change adaptation,13 but
important groundwork has been laid elsewhere. The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), adopted by the United States in 1973,
is an example of legislation upon which an effective law to encourage climate change adaptation could be modeled. The core
of the ESA determines which species to protect, which threats to
regulate, and how best to regulate to those threats.14 The ESA
serves as “a viable way to respond to the ecological reshuffling
of species” and a “guide human adaptation measures.”15 It is
America’s principal species conservation program, designed to
arrest the decline of a species and bring about its recovery.16 Particularly, sections 4, 5, 7, and 9 provide meaningful and pragmatic guidance on how human adaptation to climate change
could be achieved on an international scale.17 A multilateral
treaty that is designed around a listing function, similar to section 4 of the ESA, is essential in helping vulnerable countries to
develop climate change adaptation plans, while enlisting the
help of the broader international community to manage costs
and facilitate implementation.
This Note explores how the ESA addresses the issue of climate
adaptation and how the policies contained therein can serve as
a model for human adaptation. Part I discusses climate change
adaptation generally, as well as the argument for adaptive and
mitigative measures to address climate change. Part I also
briefly addresses existing laws on climate change. Part II focuses
on the ESA and its most forceful provisions—and how those provisions can provide a foundation for measures that promote human adaptation to climate change. Part III uses the ESA to develop principles for a multinational initiative addressing human
13. See Ira R. Feldman & Joshua H. Kahan, Sustainable Directions in U.S.
Environmental Law: Preparing for the Day After Tomorrow: Framework for
Climate Change Adaptation, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 61, 61–64 (2007).
14. J. B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building
Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV., 1, 31 (2008).
15. Ruhl, supra note 9, at 388.
16. Ruhl, supra note 14, at 13–14.
17. A human rights-based approach is both unrealistic and idealistic. See,
e.g., Simon Caney, Climate Change, Human Rights, and Moral Thresholds, in
CLIMATE ETHICS 163 (2010).
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adaptation to climate change and applies such initiatives to imperiled societies. Part IV closes with a discussion of international barriers to the implementation of human adaptation legislation. Finally, this Note concludes that the ESA does, in fact,
provide a valuable template for drafting future international climate change initiatives.
I. BACKGROUND
A. What is Climate Change?
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) is
a U.N. organization composed of hundreds of scientists and cooperating governments.18 The IPCC analyzes the most current
scientific, technical, and socioeconomic data produced worldwide, which is also relevant to the understanding of climate
change, and has proclaimed itself “the leading international
body for the assessment of climate change.”19 According to the
IPCC, climate change is “a change in the state of the climate that
can be identified . . . and that persists for an extended period of
time, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result
of human activity.”20 Although natural shifts in global temperature have occurred throughout history, there is now a consensus
in the peer-reviewed literature—and among IPCC members—
that recent temperature increases exceed variations due to natural forces, and that human activity is responsible for the bulk
of these increases.21 Carbon dioxide emissions are credited with
creating a “greenhouse effect” in which various heat-trapping

18. Organization, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Jan. 17,
2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.Uj8-lcakp7c.
19. Id.
20. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007) 1, 30 available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter Synthesis Report].
21. Katharine M. Baldwin, NEPA and CEQA: Effective Legal Frameworks
for Compelling Consideration of Adaptation to Climate Change, 82 S. CAL. L.
REV. 769, 772–73 (2009). The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report was published
in 2007 and declared that climate change is unequivocally accelerating—and
there was a 90 percent certainty that climate change was human induced. See
Edward Cameron, The Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, 15 N.W.
J. ENVT’L L. & POL’Y, 1, 1–2 (2009).
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gases produced by industrial activity are retained in the atmosphere and cause global temperatures to rise.22
While we are currently unable to predict the large scale effects
of climate change on human settlements or ecosystems, scientists are not optimistic about the years to come.23 According to
the IPCC, sea level rise under global warming is inevitable.24
Maintenance of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) concentrations at or
above present levels will not stabilize sea levels for many centuries25 and “other climate change-driven alterations in ecological,
meteorological and climactic conditions will also be facts of life,
at least until the end of this century and almost certainly much
longer.”26 In addition to rising sea levels, climate change will result in a shift in rainfall patterns, an increase in drought and
flooding, the spread of infectious disease, an increase in the frequency and intensity of tropical storms, destruction of ecosystems, melting of the polar ice caps, a rise in malnutrition, crop
failure and famine, and a decrease in access to potable water.27
Now is the time to prepare for climate change—and adaptation
must be an integral part of that preparation.28
The world’s poor will be the most adversely affected by climate
change,29 which could potentially halt, and eventually reverse,
certain human development indicators.30 As the effects of climate change become more severe, the hungry will find it harder

22. Baldwin, supra note 21, at 772–73.
23. Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation:
Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV.
9, 14–16 (2010).
24. R.K. Pachauri, Chairman, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
Press Presentation at 27th Session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 1, 13 (Nov. 17, 2007), available at http://www.worldoceanobservatory.org/events/freshwater/docs/pachauri-17-november-2007.pdf.
25. Prerna Jain & Pragati Jain, Climate Change: A Major Issue in the Sustainable Development of India, 1 INT’L. J. RES. COM., ECON. & MGMT., 136, 137
(2011).
26. Craig, supra note 23, at 24.
27. Jian & Jian, supra note 25, at 137–38.
28. Feldman & Kahan, supra note 13, at 61.
29. CHRISTIAN AID, THE HUMAN FACE OF CLIMATE CHANGE: A CHRISTIAN AID
REPORT 1, 4 (Feb. 5, 2014), available at http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/CC_impacts_adaptation_final.pdf.
30. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2007/2008: FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A
DIVIDED WORLD (2007), available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/re-
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to grow food, the displaced will find it harder to build homes, and
the impoverished will find it harder to provide for their families
and themselves.31 In the context of climate change, citizens of
developing countries are the world’s “last and least.”32 They contributed the least to the growing number of GHGs entering the
atmosphere, and thus are the least responsible for human-induced climate change.33 Unfortunately, they are also among the
least represented in the international community, and thus will
have little, if any, control over international agreements that address climate change. Moreover, they are the last to receive international aid.34 For individuals such as these, who were already vulnerable to poverty, the painful consequences of climate
change are already being felt.35 The world’s most impoverished
possess a “chronic lack of adaptive capacity, including financial,
technical, and institutional resources,” leaving them ill-prepared to deal with the myriad of threats posed by climate
change.36
The most endangered communities, like those within island
nations, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia, are heavily dependent on climate-sensitive resources, like fish, rice, grains, cereals, and other crops.37 When these and other resources disappear, these jeopardized communities have no other means of
supporting their families and must often leave their homes as
refugees.38 Although certain states, such as New Zealand, have
offered to accept displaced Pacific Islanders, these offers are rare

ports/268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf. In 2005, the World Health Organization and UNICEF estimated that over one billion people were faced with
inadequate access to fresh water and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that 820 million of the 854 million people suffering from hunger and malnutrition live in developing countries. Id.
31. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2014: SUSTAINING HUMAN PROGRESS: REDUCING VULNERABILITIES AND
BUILDING RESILIENCE 1, 20–50
(2014),
available
at
http://issuu.com/undp/docs/hdr14-report-en?e=3183072/9245907#search.
32. Cameron, supra note 21, at 4–5.
33. Jian & Jian, supra note 25, at 137.
34. Cameron, supra note 21, at 5.
35. Jian & Jian, supra note 25, at 137.
36. Cameron, supra note 21, at 4.
37. Id. at 5–6.
38. Myers, supra note 11, at 752.
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and limited.39 Another proposed solution to the problem of climate change refugees is the “safe-island” concept.40 It suggests
that island countries resettle vulnerable communities from
smaller islands, which are extremely susceptible to climate
change, to larger, more secure islands within the state.41 Proponents of the “safe-island” concept argue that it would enable governments to concentrate resources on protecting only salvageable settlements.42 But even if relocation measures, like New Zealand’s or the “safe-island” concept, were more widely adopted,
relocation is an incomplete solution to climate change—and creates problems of its own.43
As the situation stands, nations like Tuvalu face the prospect
of being washed off the face of the earth without a successor
state.44 Even nations that will not be entirely submerged are unlikely to have enough space to accommodate significant portions
of their populations, leaving potentially millions of people stateless.45 Pacific Islanders, in particular, are worried about being

39. Craig, supra note 23, at 31. States are generally more inclined to take
measures like the ones taken by India, which has built a 2,100 mile-long fence
at its border with Bangladesh to keep climate change refugees from entering
the country, and the United States, which built a similar fence along its border
with Mexico. Measures taken by the United States, the world’s largest economy, have left some in the international community with little hope that other,
less prosperous states will develop humane means of coping with the influx of
climate change refugees. Id. at 21.
40. Cameron, supra note 21, at 7.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Even if it were possible to relocate all climate change refugees, many
would rather not. Nations that will be washed away by rising sea levels are
worried about their right of self-determination and the prospect of becoming
indigent minority populations in hostile receiving states. Duong, supra note 2,
at 1251–60.
44. Burleson, supra note 4, at 29.
45. Islands, like the Maldives, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Marshalls in the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as similarly situated islands in the Caribbean, are among the most vulnerable to rising sea-levels, flooding, and tropical
storms, all of which are likely to become more extreme in the coming years.
Most of these islands presently lie only a meter or two above sea-level, and
ultimately face total elimination as sea levels continue to rise. The population
of the non-Caribbean islands is expected to exceed 50 million by 2030 and 46
million of these people are likely to find their homes and livelihoods severely
affected by climate change. See Myers, supra note 11, at 756.
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“absorbed” into foreign states and losing their national and ethnic identities.46 Climate change poses a direct threat to their
right to self-determination, which is a well-recognized and fundamental principle of international law.47 The ESA serves as a
useful model for answering many of the problems created by climate change, and can be used as a guide in crafting human adaptation initiatives.
B. Dual Response to Climate Change: Adaptation vs. Mitigation
The phrase “climate change adaptation” refers to “changes
made to better respond to present or future climactic and other
environmental conditions, thereby reducing harm . . .”48 or the
“[a]djustment in natural or human systems in response to actual
or expected climactic stimuli or their effects, which moderates
harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.”49 Adaptation, as a response to climate change, is inherently more complex than mitigation.50 Mitigative measures have a clear regulatory goal: to
substantially reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases as
soon as possible. Adaptation, however, requires responding to
potentially unforeseeable events and outcomes with a series of
localized efforts.51
Adaptation initiatives must include proactive and reactive
strategies.52 Proactive strategies try to anticipate the effects of
climate change and institute measures to reduce harm, or even
maximize benefits, to be gained from climate change.53 Such proactive strategies include crop and industry diversification, seasonal climate forecasting, water storage systems, climate change
46. Burleson, supra note 4, at 27.
47. Margaux J. Hall & David C. Weiss, Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid: Climate Change Adaptation and Human Rights Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 309, 333
(2012).
48. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 10–11 (2010) (as cited in J.B. Ruhl Climate
Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law,
40 ENVT’L L. 363, 366 (2010)).
49. J.B. Ruhl Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVT’L L. 363, 366 (2010).
50. Craig, supra note 23, at 27–28.
51. Baldwin, supra note 21, at 775.
52. Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 15
(2009).
53. Id.
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insurance programs, and supplementary irrigation systems.54 In
contrast, reactive strategies respond to climate change events
after-the-fact, and include measures like disaster recovery and
emergency response.55 In essence, climate change adaptation
seeks to respond to, rather than prevent, climate change.
Much of the international community’s focus has been on the
mitigation of GHGs, at the expense of developing a means of
learning to cope with the changes to come.56 While advocating
for a shift in focus from mitigation to adaptation, the role of mitigation in addressing climate change must not be devalued. Yet,
for too long mitigation has been portrayed as “a scientific and
technological challenge that eases us out of the climate change
problem without sacrifices or losers.”57 Such a depiction of the
current global condition is misleading, counter-productive, and
false. Because of “committed” warming—climate change that
will occur regardless of mitigation measures, as a result of already accumulated greenhouse gases in the atmosphere—what
happens to ecological systems over the next several decades will
largely be beyond human control.58 Even if drastic steps are
taken immediately to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, and regulate other contributing factors, glaciers have already begun to
melt, sea levels have already started to rise, and the atmosphere
has already been adversely affected by carbon dioxide emissions.59
Therefore, mitigation must be coupled with adaptive
measures. Such methods decrease human vulnerability while
simultaneously increasing “the adaptive capacity of both humans and the ecological systems upon which they depend.”60 Because of climate change, “humans have decisively lost the capability—to the extent we ever had it—to dictate the status of ecosystems and their services.”61 Humans tend to think of
themelves as apex predators at the top of, if not altogether removed from, the food chain. Humanity has shaped the world to

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Feldman & Kahan, supra note 13.
Ruhl, supra note 49, at 369.
Craig, supra note 23, at 9.
Baldwin, supra note 21, at 769.
Craig, supra note 23, at 21.
Id. at 14.
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fit its needs for centuries through mining, deforestation, the construction of cities and major infrastructure such as dams,
bridges, and highways. Because of climate change, however, we
no longer have the luxury of “opting out” of adapting to our surroundings.
Thus, it is no longer feasible to rely on mitigation alone; adaptation must be the new focus, and basis, for climate change policy.62 But, we need not build from the ground up. When determining how best to respond to climate change, existing laws can
provide meaningful direction in determining how to prioritize
resource allocation and formulate policies for human adaptation.
The ESA, lauded as one of the most successful environmental
laws in the world,63 serves as a meaningful illustration of effective legislation and the policies contained therein may be repurposed to address human needs. The creation of a list, similar to
the Endangered Species List, would serve as a mechanism for
ensuring that countries most likely to be affected receive adequate assistance and protection to allow them to implement climate change adaptation measures.
C. Existing Law
Although adaptation has been neglected as a means of coping
with climate change, it has not been ignored entirely. The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”), an international environmental treaty, was negotiated at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro as part of an
attempt to stabilize GHG emissions and to prevent interference
with global climactic systems.64 The treaty originally set no mandatory limits on GHG emissions for individual nations, and contained no enforcement provisions. It was effectively non-binding
on its signatories.65 Three years later, countries recognized that
the UNFCCC failed to adequately address GHG emissions and

62. Ruhl, supra note 49, at 369.
63. J.B. Ruhl, Cities, Green Construction, and the Endangered Species Act,
27 VA. ENVT’L L.J. 145, 147 (2009).
64. What is the UNFCCC & The COP?, CLIMATE LEADERS, http://www.climate-leaders.org/climate-change-resources/india-at-cop-15/unfccc-cop
(last
visited Jan. 17, 2014).
65. Id.
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adopted the Kyoto Protocol, in order to fortify the UNFCCC and
make meaningful progress in the reduction of GHG emissions.66
While the Kyoto Protocol focuses on mitigation, it makes reference to climate change adaptation in all ten of its provisions.67
Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the Protocol ask parties to provide funding, insurance, and technology to developing countries to aid in
their adaptation to climate change, as well as any other assistance required to meet their specific needs concerning climate
change adaptation.68 The Kyoto Protocol also establishes the Adaptation Fund (the “Fund”), which supports “concrete adaptation measures” such as vulnerability and adaptation assessment, capacity building, technical training and technology
transfer, pilot programs, and strengthening and developing
early warning systems for extreme weather events.69 All parties
to the UNFCCC are required to contribute to the Fund.70 In the
past three years, the Fund has “dedicated” more than US$190
million dollars to “increase climate resilience” in twenty-eight
countries.71 That amounts to approximately US$2,357,143 per
country. This figure represents the amount of money each country has been approved to receive, yet most states have received
only a fraction of the promised amount.72

66. The Kyoto Protocol was formally adopted in 1997 and now has 192 parties. Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate
Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited Jan. 17,
2014).
67. Feldman & Kahan, supra note 13, at 61.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Implementing Adaptation, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/adaptation_funding/items/2535.php, (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
71. About the Adaptation Fund, ADAPTATION FUND, https://www.adaptationfund.org/about (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
72. Funded
Projects,
ADAPTATION FUND,
https://www.adaptationfund.org/funded_projects (last visited Jan. 17, 2014). Argentina has only received US$584,154 of the US$4,296,817 in funding approved in December,
2012, to help improve the climate change resilience of small-scale agriculture
near Buenos Aires. Tanzania and the Cook Islands have each received under
US$800,000, of the approximately US$5,000,000 pledged to each state in December, 2011, to help cope with rising sea levels. Eritrea has received less than
US$900,000 of the US$6,520,850 promised to assist Anseba Region respond to
water and food scarcity. Id.
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Other important initiatives include the Least Developed Countries Work Programme, adopted in 2001, the Nairobi Work Programme, adopted in 2006, and the Cancun Adaptation Framework, adopted in 2010.73 As is typical for U.N. initiatives, all
three programs are incredibly vague and provide little practical
guidance. Instead, they often place the burden on Least Developed Countries to identify their particular needs and create national adaptation plans that outline those needs and provide
strategies to address them.74 While effective adaptation
measures require taking a localized approach and recognition of
the fact that climate change will produce varying outcomes,75
U.N. initiatives are often overly broad, to the point that they fail
to provide any substantive, meaningful guidance on how countries can address climate change.76
Though international legislation regarding human climate
change adaptation is limited, many states have developed adaptive measures at the national or subnational level regarding species that face a serious risk of extinction due to global climate
change.77 Collectively, these provisions use both mitigative and
adaptive tools, such as habitat preservation, pollution regulation, and assisted migration to limit the extinction of at-risk species.78 Many of the issues faced by endangered species are the
same as those faced by human settlements. These include the
loss of habitat; degraded ecological conditions; “induced invasions”79 where a species is forced to encroach on the habitat of
73. FOCUS: Adaptation, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/focus/adaptation/items/6999.php (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
74. Workstreams- Adaptation, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/items/6995.php
(last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
75. Global Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet, NAT’L AERONAUTICS &
SPACE ADMIN., http://climate.nasa.gov/effects (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
76. Dieter Helm, Climate-Change Policy: Why Has So Little Been Achieved?,
24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 211, 217–20 (2008).
77. Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 191–99
(2010). The United States has enacted several important domestic laws, such
as the National Forest Management Act, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act,
the National Park Service Organic Act, the Wilderness Act of 1964, and perhaps most important of all, the Endangered Species Act. Id.
78. Id.
79. Ruhl, supra note 14, at 24–25.
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others after its own territory has been destroyed; the depletion
of vital natural resources; and increasingly volatile weather patterns.80 Therefore, rather than starting from scratch, legislators
should learn whatever they can from existing measures, like the
ESA, and apply that knowledge to the problem of human adaptation and the preservation of threatened human societies.
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE FOR HUMAN
ADAPTATION
A. The Endangered Species Act
Affectionately referred to as the “pit bull” of environmental
laws, the ESA is one of the most comprehensive and effective
laws of its kind.81 Signed into law by President Nixon on December 28, 1973,82 the ESA has also been described as the “crown
jewel” of America’s environmental laws83 and “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species
ever enacted by any nation.”84 The ESA, however, has also
proved to be one of the nation’s most controversial and widely
litigated statutes.85 It has been in place for four decades and has
proven itself capable of withstanding political and judicial pressure86 with an impressive display of flexibility and adaptability.
Over the past forty years, the ESA has protected hundreds of
species from the threat of extinction.87 There are currently 2,171
species on the Endangered Species List.88 As of 2002, 30 percent
of listed species had stable populations, 6 percent were recorded
as improving, 21 percent were declining, and 39 percent were
characterized as uncertain.89 Generally, the longer a species is

80. Hall & Weiss, supra note 47, at 314–17.
81. Ruhl, supra note 66, at 147.
82. Shannon Petersen, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative
History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVT’L. L. 463, 476 (1999).
83. Id. at 464.
84. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
85. Petersen, supra note 82, at 466–67.
86. Id. at 464.
87. Ruhl, supra note 14, at 5; J. Michael Scott et al., By the Numbers, in THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 30, 16, 29–32 (2006).
88. Summary of Listed Species, Listed Populations and Recovery Plans, U.S.
FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/boxScore.jsp
(last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
89. Scott, supra note 87, at 30.
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on the list the better it has fared.90 In 1999 it was estimated that
the ESA saved as many as 227 U.S. species from extinction in
just twenty-six years.91 It has successfully responded to the myriad of challenges facing threatened species, including habitat
loss92 caused by fire, drought, and flooding.93 These challenges
in turn drive species from their traditional habitats to locations
which may be ill-suited to their survival or result in the introduction of foreign species into stable ecological systems which
cause disruption in the ecological equilibrium to the detriment
of other species.94
Climate change does not just displace animal species. It also
creates millions of human “climate change refugees,” and causes
millions of other people to fall farther into poverty and contract
various climate-change-related diseases.95 The ESA “takes a
species-specific approach that has proven effective when employed to address discrete human-induced threats that have
straightforward causal connections to a species.”96 The “speciesspecific” approach adopted by the ESA provides a useful starting
point in solving how humanity will adapt to the global phenomena broadly encapsulated in the term “climate change,” and all
of the sub-issues, such as temperature increase, rise in water
levels, change in precipitation levels and patterns, decrease in
90. Id.
91. Id. at 31.
92. Id. at 30.
93. Camacho, supra note 77, at 179.
94. Jason S. McLachlan et al., A Framework for Debate of Assisted Migration in an Era of Climate Change, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 297, 298 (2007).
95. Myers, supra note 11, at 752.
The incidence of mosquito-borne diseases, including malaria, dengue,
and viral encephalitis, are among those diseases most sensitive to climate . . . . Climate-related increases in sea surface temperature and
sea level can lead to higher incidence of water-borne infectious and
toxin-related illnesses, such as cholera and shellfish poisoning. Human migration and damage to health infrastructures from the projected increase in climate variability could indirectly contribute to disease transmission. Human susceptibility to infections might be further compounded by malnutrition due to climate stress on agriculture
and potential alterations in the human immune system caused by increased flux of ultraviolet radiation. Johnathan A. Patz, et al., Global
Climate Change and Emerging Infectious Diseases, 275 J. AM. MED.
ASSOC. 217, 218 (1996).
96. Ruhl, supra note 14, at 6.
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availability of potable water, and the extinction of various species, to which it refers. Although the ESA is a powerful statute,
it is also extremely flexible.97
B. Key Provisions of the ESA
Section 4 outlines the means by which species are categorized
as “endangered” or “threatened.”98 Section 4(a)(1) requires the
Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) to use “the best scientific and
commercial data available” to determine whether the threat of
reduction in habitat, overutilization, disease or predation, inadequacy of regulatory mechanisms, or other natural, or
manmade, factors have rendered the species endangered or
threatened.99 This section precludes the consideration of any
economic factors when determining whether a species should be
categorized as threatened or endangered.100 Though the power
of the ESA is primarily rooted in sections 4, 7, and 9,101 Section
5 is another important provision of the ESA. It contains a concise
grant of authority that vests the Secretary of the Interior with

97. Id. at 27.
Climate change adaptation . . . should be based on principled flexibility . . . .[P]rincipled flexibility means that both the law and regulators
(1) distinguish in legally significant ways uncontrollable climate
change impacts from controllable anthropogenic impacts on species,
resources, and ecosystems that can and should be actively managed
and regulated, and (2) implement consistent principles for an overall
climate change adaptation strategy, even though application of those
principles in particular locations in response to specific climate
change impacts will necessarily encompass a broad and creative range
of adaptation decisions and actions. Craig, supra note 23, at 17.
Such an adaptation is possible through restructuring of the Endangered Species Act to apply it to human communities. Such flexibility can be found in the
ESA.
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1973).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)–(E). Collectively, all plants, mammals, fish,
birds, amphibians, reptiles, crustaceans, mollusks, arthropods, and other invertebrates are eligible for protection under the ESA. 16 U.S.C. §1532(8), (14),
(16) (1973). The Secretary of the Interior has delegated his power to the Fish
and Wildlife Service, while the Secretary of Commerce has delegated his power
to the National Marine Fisheries Service. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(15), 1533(a)(1).
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
101. Petersen, supra note 82, at 464.
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the ability to acquire land, through purchase, donation, or otherwise, as he deems necessary to the advancement of the threatened or endangered species.102
Section 7 governs interagency cooperation.103 It mandates that
all federal agencies consult with the Secretary to ensure that
“any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . .
. is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction
or adverse modification of habitat of such species.”104 In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Supreme Court greatly expanded
section 7 of the ESA.105 Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
concluded that
[o]ne would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose
terms were any plainer than those in section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively command all
federal agencies to “insure that actions authorized, funded, or
carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence”
of an endangered species or “result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species . . . .” This language admits
of no exception.106

In other words, section 7 serves as “an absolute bar against
any federal action that might jeopardize a listed species.”107
Section 9 is commonly referred to as the “takings clause” of the
ESA and makes it illegal to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in
any such conduct” against fish and animal species listed as endangered.108 “Harm” has been afforded a broad construction and
interpreted to include activities that create a “significant environmental modification or degradation.”109 In Gibbs v. Babbitt,

102. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1)–(2) (1973).
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1973).
104. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
105. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
106. Id. at 173.
107. Petersen, supra note 82, at 465.
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1973). The takings clause does not automatically
apply to species listed as “threatened,” and weaker protections apply to the
takings of plants. Specifically, § 1533(d) provides that threatened species are
protected by regulations that the Secretary determines to be “necessary and
advisable,” while § 1541 governs the takings of plants.
109. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006).
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the Fourth Circuit held that the protections under section 9 extend to private property; accordingly, the ESA empowers the
FWS to limit land use activities on private property that might
indirectly harm a listed species.110 Courts have consistently upheld this broad interpretation of section 9, making the ESA “the
most powerful regulatory provision in all of environmental
law.”111
III. THE ESA AS AN EFFECTIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ADDRESSING HUMAN ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Many of the issues faced by endangered species under the ESA
are the same as those facing human settlements endangered by
climate change—such as the loss of habitat, degraded ecological
conditions, the depletion of natural resources, and increasingly
volatile weather patterns.112 Unfortunately, there are precious
few laws that address issues faced by human communities to the
degree and scope the ESA addresses animal adaptation. Instead
of starting anew, policymakers must learn what they can from
the ESA and similar statutes in order to prioritize resource allocation and policy formation for human adaptation to climate
change. No provision of the ESA specifically addresses climate,
emissions, or pollutants; instead, the statute “operates on fairly
holistic levels, requiring the FWS to consider what constitutes
endangerment, taking, jeopardy, and recovery of species.”113 The
ESA directs the Secretary of the Interior to compile an Endangered Species List (“ESL”) that contains all species determined,
either by the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce, to be threatened.114 The Secretary of the Interior then
formulates and administers conservation and recovery initiatives that are tailored to the needs of each species.115 These initiatives must consider the manner in which climate change will
pit various species against each other, but also accept when certain species have reached a point where human assistance cannot bring about their recovery.116 A similar list should be com-

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
Petersen, supra note 82, at 466 n.26.
Hall & Weiss, supra note 47, at 314–17.
Ruhl, supra note 14, at 29.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(1) (1973).
Id.
Ruhl, supra note 14, at 30.
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piled outlining states that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Once listed, these countries
would be entitled to protections similar to species placed on the
ESL, particularly those outlined in sections 4, 5, 7, and 9 of the
ESA.
Such an Endangered States initiative could be established
through an international convention, and be overseen by a multilateral institution using weighted voting in a manner similar
to the World Bank.117 Member states would “own” the institution118 and shares would be divided between wealthy and poor
countries. Wealthy states would be able to secure greater shares
through increased financial support while poor countries’ ownership would be determined based on their respective levels of
need and risk. Although many states may be more concerned
with how climate change will affect their own people, climate
change will not occur in a vacuum—its effects will be felt across
the planet. It will spill across borders in the form of refugees,
resource scarcity, and natural disasters.119 Because proactive
adaptation is both cheaper and more effective than reactive reconstruction,120 it is possible to use the impending effects of
global warming to encourage a level of international cooperation
unseen since the end of World War II.

117. See Sandro Blanco & Enrique Carrasco, Pursuing the Good Life: The
Meaning of Development as It Relates to the World Bank and the IMF, 67
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 70–72, 78 (1999). Both the IMF and
World Bank were born from the financial instability facing Europe after the
Second World War. The Bretton Woods Conference was held in New Hampshire in the summer of 1944, where the participants’ primary goals were the
promotion of currency stability, the creation of a system of international payments, and the formulation of a plan for the economic reconstruction of Europe.
International development was a secondary concern. Id at 70–71. We are now
presented with a similar opportunity to capitalize on catastrophe; climate
change has been described as a global disaster not unlike a world war. Burleson, supra note 4, at 26.
118. Blanco & Carrasco, supra note 118, at 78.
119. WORLD HEALTH ORG., PROTECTING HEALTH FROM CLIMATE CHANGE:
WORLD HEALTH DAY 2008, at 5 (2008), available at http://www.who.int/worldhealth-day/toolkit/report_web.pdf.
120. See Frank Lecocq & Zmarak Shalizi, Balancing Expenditures on Mitigation of and Adaptation to Climate Change: An Exploration of Issues Relevant
to Developing Countries, 1, 5 (World Bank Dev. Res. Grp. Sustainable Rural &
Urb. Dev. Team Working Paper No. 4299, 2007), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4299.
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A. Section 4: Determining Which Countries to List
The ESA defines an “endangered species” as “any species
which is in danger of extinction through all or a significant portion of its range.”121 It further defines a “threatened species” as
“any species which is likely to become an endangered species
within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”122 In deciding whether a species is threatened,
section 4 directs the Secretary of the Interior to consider a set of
natural or manmade factors, including the catchall, “other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence.”123 A
determination that any of these criteria have been satisfied results in the species being placed on the ESL.124 The ESA outlines
the listing procedure in great detail125 and requires that listings
be made as expeditiously as possible. Moreover, the ESA seeks
to limit administrative discretion to postpone or delay in the decision-making process.126 Once listed, the protections of the ESA
automatically apply to that species. A similar listing system,
something like an Endangered States List, if applied to endangered states and overseen by an administrative agency, would
serve as an effective means to quickly identify states which are
abnormally at risk to the adverse effects of climate change. Additionally, an Endangered States List would require other states
to help enforce adaptation measures, in order to support a listed
state’s response to climate change.

121. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1973).
122. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
123. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(E) (1973).
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)–(E). Because of the subjective nature of § 4’s
language regarding listing criteria and the uncertainty relating to the future
of climate change, courts generally defer to agency expertise. Whether to list a
species or not is often considered a matter of agency discretion, adding to the
ESA’s flexibility. Ruhl, supra note 14, at 33. Listing determinations may be
reversed when a species presents “such a compelling case of climate change
threat that even an aggressive use of discretion could not support a decision
not to list.” Ruhl, id. at 34.
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2)(B)–(D).
126. Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation
by the U.S. Departments of the Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV.,
277, 288 (1993).
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All states will be affected by climate change to some degree,127
but only the most imperiled states warrant the heightened protection of an Endangered States List. Listed states would be selected based on their particular vulnerability to climate change,
using criteria similar to those outlined in section 4(a)(1). Such
factors may include location, GDP, average per capita income,
population size and proportion of population likely to be severely
affected by climate change, ease of migration or integration of
the affected populations into other states or other regions of
their native state, key industries of the state, and regional
weather patterns, among other considerations. In weighing
these factors, no single criterion would be determinative, so as
to better maintain the flexibility reflected in the ESA.
Once listed, states would be entitled to a series of protections
based on the degree of threat they face (i.e., endangered versus
threatened, as in the ESL), which would commence immediately.128 Although Recovery Plans under the ESA are optional,

127. Feldman & Kahan, supra note 13, at 61. Developed nations are not immune from the effects of climate change, but they are better equipped to adapt
to those effects. In the Netherlands, the Dutch have already taken extensive
measures to guard against rising sea levels, including the fortification of existing dikes and floodgates, the enactment of aggressive flood plan controls, new
zoning and development plans, and government acquisition of farmland. The
government will use this farmland to allow controlled flooding, in order to alleviate stress on the dikes and levees. In Britain, a floodgate called the Thames
Barrier has been constructed to protect London from flooding. Baldwin, supra
note 21, at 777.
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)–(d). An FWS listing review team was established in
October, 1989, to review a proposal and conservation strategy prepared by the
Interagency Scientific Committee to Address the Conservation of the Northern
Spotted Owl. The proposal was over 400 pages long and examined owl populations, habit trends, and the unique threats facing the owl. It also proposed a
conservation strategy and a plan for the implementation of that strategy. The
proposal furthermore conducted a cost-benefit and risk analysis of the implementation. The team made a final recommendation to list the Northern Spotted Owl in June, 1990, that triggered requirements that the Forrest Service
and Bureau of Land Management confer with the FWS under § 7 of the ESA.
Interim guidelines were then prepared by the FWS to assist agencies in evaluating timber industry practices that would impact the Northern Spotted Owl.
These protections were put in place as early as 1990. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERVICE, REVISED RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL (2011),
available
at
http://www.fws.gov/arcata/es/birds/nso/documents/USFWS2011RevisedRecoveryPlanNorthernSpottedOwl.pdf.
States
would undergo a similarly extensive review process, whereby information
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and are developed at the discretion of the FWS, in the case of the
Endangered States List the overseeing agency would be required
to develop such a plan.129 These Recovery Plans would give priority to countries that are most likely to benefit from such
plans—particularly those that are financially or developmentally unable to adapt on their own.130 Recovery Plans would allow for the creation of customized initiatives based on the unique
conditions present in the state, resulting in greater efficacy for
each state.
In developing Recovery Plans, the agency would be empowered
to establish “recovery teams” composed of representatives from
various public and private agencies, institutions, and other persons with knowledge of the unique risks faced by that particular
country.131 Recovery teams would enable endangered communities to have a greater voice in the development of their nation’s
adaptation initiatives, and better allow for meaningful prioritization of the initiatives in the Recovery Plan, while also establishing an authoritative body of experts to oversee adaptive initiatives on a national level. Furthermore, listed countries would
be subject to monitoring and periodic review by the governing
agency, which would evaluate both the status and progress of
the listed country, allowing the listed country to assess both the
successes and failures of the Recovery Plan, and make alterations where necessary.132
would be gathered relating to the local population, economy, and infrastructure. That information would then be used to draft a proposal, conservation
strategy, and interim measures to be used until the conservation strategy could
be put into full effect.
129. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).
130. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(A).
131. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(2).
132. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(c)(2)(A) and 1533(g). An Endangered States List
(“List”) would overlap, to an extent, the Adaptation Fund (the “Fund). But,
unlike the Fund, the List’s detailed and specific procedural mechanisms are
unlikely to have the procedural delays and inefficiencies which remain problematic for the Fund. The Adaptation Fund currently has thirty-five projects.
Of the Fund’s US$232 million endowment, only US$96 million has been dispersed. Projects & Programmes, ADAPTATION FUND, https://www.adaptationfund.org/funded_projects/interactive (last visited Sept. 2, 2014). Another issue
plaguing the Fund is that, when states apply, they must first develop their own
adaptation projects, which are then reviewed by the Fund and, only then, either approved or rejected. How to Apply, ADAPTATION FUND, https://www.adaptation-fund.org/page/apply-for-funding (last visited Jan. 17, 2014). Furthermore, the Fund only deals with adaptation. It in no way affords participating
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B. Section 5: Land Acquisition
Though extremely brief, section 5 is a vital, yet undervalued,
component of the ESA. It requires the Secretaries of Interior,
Commerce, and Agriculture to create wildlife conservation programs to protect species listed under the ESA. To that end, the
Secretaries are authorized “to acquire by purchase, donation or
otherwise, lands waters or interest therein.”133 While section 5
only makes explicit reference to noncoercive means of obtaining
private property (i.e., purchase and donation), the inclusion of
the word “otherwise” opens the door to the use of other, forcible
means of obtaining private property, such as condemnation.134
Although section 5 is used to acquire lands deemed necessary to
the survival of an endangered or threatened species,135 in an international context, a land acquisition provision similar to section 5 could be used to set aside invulnerable territory within
endangered states both for the relocation and reestablishment
of climate change refugees, and for the construction of climatechange-resistant infrastructure and other adaptive measures.
Such a provision would not be used to create successor states for
people, like the Tuvaluans, who are expected to lose their nation
to climate change, but would be helpful in preserving threatened
territory or purchasing homes for displaced persons in more secure regions.136

states anything resembling a protected status or requires other states to take
preventative or mitigative measures to protect more vulnerable communities.
Helm, supra note 76. The Adaptation Fund is a valuable tool in helping vulnerable states to adapt to climate change, but is an insufficient solution, by
itself, to the problems endangered states face.
133. 16 USC § 1534(a)(2) (1973).
134. Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act
and Private Property, 24 ENVT’L. L. 369, 401–02 (1994) (citing 16 U.S.C. §
1534(a)(1)(2)).
135. 16 U.S.C § 1534.
136. Although most litigation involving § 5 involves attempts by states and
municipalities to limit or condition federal land acquisition, cases involving
other sections, such as Tennessee Valley Authority and Gibbs v. Babbitt demonstrate that economic and private property interests are unlikely to curtail federal exercise of its § 5 powers. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978); Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
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C. Section 7: Cooperation and the Division of Power between
States and Agencies
Section 7 sets out elaborate consultation procedures under
which the agency proposing an action that could affect an endangered species must consult with the FWS.137 Before engaging in
any major federal action, an agency must undergo an extensive
review process to determine the potential impacts of the project
on listed species. If the project is determined to have negative
effects on the species, it cannot proceed without mitigation or
negation of those effects.138 This broad duty to cooperate has the
potential to make this section the “keystone” of an effective variation of the Endangered States Act. With its breadth, flexibility,
and non-coercive approach, section 7 permits federal agencies to
take the lead in national conservation efforts and enact ecosystem-wide measures, through interagency coordination and cooperation.139 As applied to imperiled states, a provision similar to
section 7 would prohibit states from permitting, funding, or carrying out any action that could jeopardize a listed country or its
people.140 Thus, the provision would force states to engage in an
extensive consultation process before acting, and would serve
both to promote international public awareness, more informed
decision-making, and a more thorough examination of less intrusive, alternative actions.
Environmental litigation is both burdensome and costly.
Plaintiffs in environmental litigation are often constrained by
current technological capabilities in their efforts to meet evidentiary burdens.141 Courts look unfavorably upon attenuated
chains of causation, wherein a country’s actions are alleged to

137. Ruhl, supra note 14, at 43.
138. Christopher H.M. Carter, A Dual Track for Incidental Takings: Reexamining Sections 7 and 10 of the Endangered Species Act, 19 B.C. ENVT’L. AFF. L.
REV. 135, 147–51 (1991).
139. J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies’ Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVT’L. L. 1107, 1110–11 (1995).
140. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). Under § 7(a)(1), federal agencies are not obligated
to promote the recovery of listed species. Rather, they must avoid taking actions that could jeopardize those species. Carter, supra note 138, at 138.
141. Ruhl, supra note 14, at 40.
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have indirectly resulted in the destruction or adverse modification of critical territory in a listed state.142 This may prove problematic for section 7’s broad “no jeopardy” requirement. Similarly, many states may be unwilling, or unable, to engage in the
lengthy consultation process that section 7 would require when
undertaking state projects. In practice, this may mean that violations of section 7 would be less frequently enforced through
litigation than section 9 violations.
D. Section 9: Prohibited Actions
Section 9 of the ESA outlines various acts which cannot be
taken against listed species.143 An international treaty aimed at
promoting climate change adaptation initiatives in states that
are particularly vulnerable could rely on this provision to determine which actions to ban in order to assist listed countries. Section 9, commonly referred to as the “take provision,” is helpful in
creating a climate adaptation statute because it is an early attempt to define the various actions that can threaten not only a
species, but also its critical habitat. It applies to acts which “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” protected species144 as well as any act that results in the
modification of its habitat or that “actually kills or injures” members of the species by “impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”145
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Greater Oregon, the Supreme Court held that habit modification
is an appropriate application of the word “harm,” and that “take”
can apply to both direct and indirect contact with listed species.146 To avoid overly attenuated chains of causation, the Court

142. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Ore.,
515 U.S. 687, n.9 (1995).
143. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1973).
144. Id.
145. Id. Section 9’s taking prohibition makes it a federal offense to harm or
injure, or attempt to harm or injure, any listed endangered animal species in
the United States, whether on public or private land. This makes § 9, arguably,
the most powerful piece of wildlife legislation in the world. Federico Cheever,
An Introduction to the Prohibition against Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with a Powerful Species Preservation Law, 62 COLO. L. REV. 109, 111 (1991).
146. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 678.
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determined that, in many cases, the party proposing this indirect harm theory will bear the burden of proof.147 In climate
change cases, current technological capabilities are usually unable to surmount such high evidentiary and proof burdens.148
Plaintiffs in a climate change case brought under section 9 have
typically been unable to demonstrate that the emission practices
of the offending entity directly and definitively led a listed species to suffer harm.149 It is probable that these evidentiary hurdles would carry over to a human-centered adaptation initiative.
The evidentiary difficulty could be resolved, however, through a
more tailored definition of “harm,” as related to endangered communities, including a more developed list of undesired actions or
behaviors that constitute “harm.”
One reason that section 9 is powerful enough to be effective is
that it is also flexible enough to allow for the complexities of species and ecosystem biology, and responsive enough to allow for
the adoption of new policies and methodologies as our understanding of these species develops.150 Like species, states possess
various unique characteristics that must be considered in the
adoption of adaptation initiatives. Thus, any such initiative
would require considerable flexibility. An international covenant modeled on some of the features contained in section 9
would possess the requisite flexibility to accommodate these interstate differences. Furthermore, for many threatened communities, climate change is already bearing down, and its effects
will continue without respite for the foreseeable future.151 The
aim of a multilateral treaty, such as the one this Note describes,
is to enable as many people to withstand and survive the effects
of climate change as possible. For people like the Tuvaluans, the
creation of a successor state in a less vulnerable part of the world
is not an option. Past attempts at such state-making have
failed,152 and any attempt to do so on a massive scale, as adapting to climate change would require, is impractical. Climate
147. Id. at 711.
148. Ruhl, supra note 14, at 40.
149. Id.
150. Cheever, supra note 145, at 119.
151. A Citizen’s Guide to Climate Refugees, supra note 6.
152. Generally speaking, state creation, as in Palestine and Nigeria, has led
to brutal regional conflict and engendered intense backlash from neighboring
states. See generally, Joseph H. Weiler, Israel and the Creation of Palestinian
State: The Art of the Impossible and the Possible, 17 TEX. INT’L L. J. 287 (1982);
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change refugees must relocate to nations that will accept them,
and try to make new lives for themselves in more stable regions.
Drastic measures are needed to respond to the adverse effects of
climate change. Section 9 should serve as an illustration of the
way in which acts seen as detrimental to listed states should be
prohibited and how to address infractions.
IV. LIMITS AND BARRIERS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
ADAPTIVE MEASURES AND THE ENDANGERED STATES LIST AS A
SOLUTION
A. Uncertainty and Cost
One of the main reasons adaptation has received less attention
from the scientific and legal community than mitigation has is
that adaptation is the more inherently complex of the two.153
While most scholars agree that climate change is taking place—
and that human activities have exacerbated that change—there
is still much disagreement among experts about what changes
will occur, when those changes will occur, and what should be
done in preparation for those changes.154 Predicting climate
change is intrinsically difficult because climate change “alters
baseline ecosystem conditions in ways that are currently beyond
immediate human control, regardless of mitigation efforts,”155
and “complicates and even obliterates familiar ecologies, with
regulatory and management consequences.”156 For many years,
ecologists have operated under the assumption that ecosystems
have natural ranges that are both healthy and essential to the
survival and evolution of the ecosystem.157 But, science can no
longer determine which changes are normal or naturally occurring and which are the unnatural result of human interference.158
No one wants to resort to guessing, especially when time is
short and financial resources are limited, but unpredictability is

Henry E. Alapiki, State Creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National
Integration and Local Autonomy, 48 AFRICAN STUDIES REV. 3, 49 (2005).
153. Feldman & Kahan, supra note 13, at 61.
154. Baldwin, supra note 21, at 776–78.
155. Craig, supra note 23, at 15.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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routine in the world of climate change. Climate change “is creating a world of triage, best guesses, and shifting sands. The
sooner we start adapting legal regimes to these new regulatory
and management realities, the sooner we can marshal energy
and resources into actions that will help humans, species, and
ecosystems cope with the changes that are coming.”159 To further
complicate the matter, climate change will not have a uniform
effect on all regions of the planet.160 While some regions will experience a rise in sea levels, others may experience a decline;161
some species will face extinction or be forced to relocate, whereas
others may thrive under the new conditions created by climate
change, particularly in the short term.162 While some areas experience drought, others will experience an increase in rainfall;163 some crops will fail while others prosper. Millions of people will become impoverished, hundreds of thousands will be
forced to relocate as climate change refugees, and a much
smaller number of people will prosper.164 Such a wide array of
outcomes makes the application of a single, universal rule extremely difficult; climate change adaptation must take a localized approach.165 The measures described in this Note allow an
international treaty to combine broad compliance with narrowly-tailored initiatives designed to reflect the individual needs
of each listed country. Using the broad provisions outlined
above,166 states would be able to use the funding and expertise of
the international community to address climate change impacts
unique to their respective country.
Cost serves as another obstacle to adaptation programs. Climate change adaptation is expensive. Massive financial resources are needed to respond to the damage caused by climate

159. Id. at 16.
160. Nicholas Stern, What is the Economics of Climate Change?, 7 WORLD
ECON. 1, 2 (2006).
161. J.X. Mitrovika et al., The Sea-Level Fingerprint of West Arctic Collapse,
323 SCI. 753 (2009) (suggesting that, although the world generally may experience a sea-level rise, some areas may actually experience a net decrease in
sea-level).
162. Eric Post et al., Ecological Dynamics Across the Artic Associated with
Recent Climate Change, 325 SCI. 1355 (2009).
163. Synthesis Report, supra note 20.
164. Ruhl, supra note 49, at 378–80.
165. Craig, supra note 23, at 16–17.
166. See Section III.
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change, and to fund “climate-proofing” infrastructure.167 The estimated cost of global protection against one meter of sea level
rise will exceed one trillion dollars.168 Most funding for climate
change adaptation is currently derived from international donors.169 The funding is then redistributed through agencies like
the World Bank, the Adaptation Fund, and the Global Environmental Facility.170 Measures like those proposed in this Note
may cut costs by tailoring initiatives to the state in which they
are applied and allowing for regular progress evaluations, which
would redirect funds from unsuccessful initiatives to those
which showed more promise. Initiatives created under an Endangered States List would also be more successful than those
created under the Adaptation Fund because they would be developed after a state has been afforded protection. Additionally,
they would take a holistic approach to the implementation of initiatives throughout the state, rather than just focusing on one
or two specific projects. Protection under an Endangered States
List would allow efforts to be concentrated in the areas where
they are most needed, most likely to yield considerable success,
and most beneficial to the greatest number of people.
B. Societal Resistance and International Cooperation
Societal resistance among industrialized nations has served as
another obstacle to broad acceptance of adaptation initiatives.171
As with many market issues, externalities play a vital role in the
reduction of GHGs. Developed nations, and the industries on
which their economies depend, emit large quantities of GHGs
with little to no regulation. Those GHGs, in turn, cause damage
to others, with no direct cost to the emitters.172 The states responsible for emissions have few incentives to reduce them, and
the states that are most affected by the emissions lack the political power to affect policy decisions. For example, all 193 member states have an equal voice in U.N. negotiations, so it is easy
for those opposed to mitigative or adaptive measures to obstruct
167. Baldwin, supra note 21, at 779.
168. Improve Predictions of Future Land-ice Loss and Impacts on Sea Level,
STUDY ENVTL. ARCTIC CHANGE (Oct. 2012), http://www.arcus.org/search/landice.
169. Hall & Weiss, supra note 46, at 328.
170. Id.
171. Stern, supra note 160, at 4.
172. Id.
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and prevent any meaningful initiatives from being adopted.173 In
many respects, the UNFCC’s Kyoto Protocol puts forth inadequate targets, ineffective or insufficient instruments for meeting
those targets, and implementation systems that are poorly conceived and lack any real means of enforcement.174 The Protocol
is plagued by these complications because few nations would
agree to stricter measures. Governments generally lack “the political will to impose tough lifestyle sacrifices on people in general,”175 leading to international environmental agreements that
rarely have enough force to produce real change. Furthermore,
externalities are often solved through taxation of an undesirable
activity, the allocation of property rights over an affected area,
and direct regulation,176 but the international community has
time and again demonstrated its unwillingness to submit to this
level of environmental regulation.177
The initiatives proposed in this Note will not meet staunch resistance in developed nations, because they do not require any
substantive reduction of emissions or any other major lifestyle
changes. Rather, this Note proposes a balanced approach that
contains adaptive as well as mitigative measures. States can
participate through donations and restricting harmful commercial or industrial activity and thereby receive all of the soft
power benefits without any major drawbacks. The Endangered
States Act would be a “harm-preventing law,” not a benefit mandating one.178 The ESA would not require parties to take extensive proactive action; its emphasis, rather, is on refraining from
acting in a manner likely to have adverse consequences for
states that are at an elevated risk.

173. See generally, J. Robinson & J. Tinker, Reconciling Ecological, Economic
and Social Imperatives, in THE CORNERSTONE OF DEVELOPMENT: INTEGRATING
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES, 9, 9–13 (Feb. 5, 2014), available
at
http://www.seachangecop.org/files/documents/1998_IDRC_The_Cornerstone_of_Development__Integrating_Environmental_Social_Economic_Policies.pdf.
174. Cameron, supra note 21, at 10.
175. Ruhl, supra note 49, at 368.
176. Stern, supra note 160, at 4.
177. See Carsten Helm, Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes, 44 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 630, 652 (2000).
178. Ruhl, supra note 63, at 141.
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CONCLUSION
The impending effects of global climate change are rightly likened to those of a world war,179 and the Tuvaluans are among
the first casualties.180 Recent increases in global surface temperatures are both unprecedented and irreversible.181 Mitigation
and reactionary measures are incomplete solutions;182 proactive,
adaptive measures must also be adopted to fully cope with climate change. The ESA, as modified to fit the needs of human
adaptation, would serve as a meaningful step in the right direction. An Endangered States List would offer a means of coping
with climate change through proactive, adaptive measures by
providing long-term solutions to the long-term problem that is
global climate change. An examination of sections 4, 5, 7, and 9
of the ESA demonstrates how human adaptation to climate
change on an international scale could proceed in an effective,
manageable way.183 Such a program would be invaluable in helping vulnerable countries to develop climate change adaptation
plans, while enlisting the help of the broader international community to alleviate costs and facilitate implementation.
Although it is easy to feel removed from the plight of Tuvalu,
one must not fall into the trap of believing that the rest of us are
beyond the reach of climate change. Global climate change is just
that, a global epidemic that will cross international borders and
national boundaries indiscriminately. Tuvalu “might just be one

179. Burleson, supra note 4, at 26.
180. Duong, supra note 2, at 1239.
181. NPR, supra note 6.
182. Craig, supra note 23, at 9.
183. See Ruhl, supra note 14. Sections 4, 5, 7, and 9 are just some of the ESA
sections with the potential for international application. Others, such as section 8, are also promising and warrant further exploration. Section 8 of the
ESA provides guidelines on how to promote international cooperation through
financial assistance, the encouragement of adaptation programs, supplying
useful personnel, and conducting necessary research and investigations. 16
U.S.C. § 1537 (1973). In an Endangered States Act, a governing body, established by party nations, would replace the President in the ESA by “assisting
in the development and management of programs,” in listed countries that the
agency determines are “necessary or useful” for the conservation of any endangered or threatened state. 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a). This governing body would also
make available any officer or employee of the governing body who would be
useful in facilitating the adaptation initiatives in listed countries. 16 U.S.C. §
1537(a).
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little canary, but we are all in the same coal mine.”184 It may be
too late for certain island nations, like Tuvalu, but through the
implementation of a proactive, adaptive, and mitigative treaty,
many endangered states can be saved from extinction, and we
may be able to preserve the planet both for ourselves and for
future generations. There is but one Earth. The actions we take
today will shape the world of tomorrow; a world we will all have
to live in.
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